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If the European Union is to be ready to 
share in the responsibility for global 
security and building a better world, as the 
European Security Strategy states, it is evident 
that the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) must be strengthened: 
Europe still struggles to deploy more than 
4% of its 1.8 million troops, and still the 
major capability shortfalls have not been 
addressed. Obviously, the existing 
mechanisms for capability development in 
the EU (as well as in NATO for that 
matter) have failed to generate significantly 
more deployable European capabilities, 
and will probably never do so. If no action 
is taken, one cannot even hope for a 
standstill. Things will get worse, because of 
the economic crisis, which has already 
resulted in yet another series of budgetary 
cuts, and which will ensure continued 
budgetary pressure on all Member States. 
So the challenge is to provide the Union 
with more effective military capabilities to 
mount crisis management operations 
notwithstanding the current budgetary 
hurdles.  
CSDP needs a new stimulus. The Lisbon 
Treaty actually provides several, not in the 
least the appointment of a permanent 
President of the European Council and the 
strengthening of the position of the High 
Representative, which can be hoped to 
generate more strategy, coherence and 
proactive policies at the highest political 
level. The extended definition of the 
Petersberg Tasks and the adoption of the 
Solidarity Clause, allowing the use of 
CSDP within the territory of the Union, 
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will help as well to set directions for future 
CSDP operations. Mutual Defence is 
another important addition. That leaves the 
required capabilities, in which area the 
Treaty introduces a new mechanism: 
Permanent Structured Cooperation in 
Defence (PSCD).  
Unfortunately, PSCD features high among 
the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty that 
some EU Member States seem to have 
forgotten that they subscribed to. Perhaps 
because it is so ambitious: by setting 
criteria for participation, for the first time 
participating Member States (pMS) would 
enter into binding commitments in the 
field of defence and allow an EU body, the 
European Defence Agency (EDA) to 
assess their performance. This high level of 
ambition was clear from the outset, when 
PSCD was first formulated in the 
Convention. It is true, the Convention’s 
initial proposals had an exclusive flavour to 
them, as some sought to create a small 
avant-garde of those Member States 
spending the most on defence and 
launching the most sophisticated 
armaments programmes, with the others 
being relegated to a secondary role. Such a 
scheme would indeed have been divisive. 
From the moment however of its 
incorporation in the Constitutional Treaty, 
the provisions of which were afterwards 
copied into the Lisbon Treaty, PSCD has 
been in the process of being rethought as a 
more inclusive mechanism, aiming to 
incorporate as many Member States as 
possible. As EU-operations have shown, 
e.g. in Chad, the contributions of all 
Member States are indeed welcome and 
necessary.   
Therefore, the challenge now is to 
configure PSCD in such a way that it 
strengthens CSDP without dividing the 
Union. Rather, PSCD ought to increase 
solidarity and convergence. No longer 
seeking to establish an exclusive and highly 
political vanguard signposting the way 
ahead, the aim now is to create a pragmatic 
process that is attractive to all Member 
States, output-oriented and cost-effective.  
A CONCRETE PROPOSAL FOR 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
If the method is of necessity complex, the 
aim set by the Lisbon Treaty is simple: to 
proceed more intensely to develop defence 
capacities, which must of course be 
available and deployable. So more quickly 
than existing mechanisms, PSCD should 
enable pMS to field more and better 
equipped troops for the full range of 
operations and in all frameworks in which 
they engage: EU-led operations under 
CSDP,  NATO, the UN, the OSCE and 
others. Our concrete proposal to 
implement PSCD has three dimensions: 
criteria, a permanent capability generation 
conference, and multinational 
cooperation.1 
Criter ia . No strict entrance criteria, but 
well-defined commitments to be achieved 
by pMS by an agreed deadline. We propose 
an integral set of four criteria:  
(1) To be able: 
The ultimate objective is to 
increase the deployability and 
sustainability of pMS’ armed forces 
                                                
1 For a more detailed version see 
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/10/sec-
gov/SPB-9_PSCD.pdf.  
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by an agreed percentage within an 
agreed timeframe, until an agreed 
target is reached.  
 
(2) Solidarity in defence spending: 
pMS should harmonize their 
defence expenditures. At the very 
least, pMS spending less than the 
EU average2 should commit not to 
further decrease their defence 
expenditures, neither in real terms 
nor in % of GDP.  
 
(3) Solidarity in common programmes 
led by the EDA: 
pMS should contribute fully to the 
programmes of the EDA, which is 
to be used as the forum to mount 
collective projects, notably to 
address the commonly identified 
strategic shortfalls. Obviously pMS 
cannot take part in each and every 
EDA project; they will select 
specific programmes that fit with 
their expertise and force structure. 
But their share in the overall cost 
of all projects combined should 
reflect their respective GDP, in 
order to ensure fair burden-sharing 
between pMS.  
 
(4) Solidarity whenever CSDP 
operations are launched: 
As an expression of the political 
solidarity that must underpin 
CSDP, pMS will participate in all 
CSDP operations requiring military 
assets (of the unanimous Council 
decision to launch which they are 
of course a part) with significant 
contributions, i.e. with military 
forces deployed in theatre and 
listed in the Statement of 
Requirements; the size and type are 
left to their own discretion. As a 
further option, in the context of 
                                                
2 In 2008, 1,63% of GDP.  
PSCD the pMS could also 
strengthen financial solidarity 
between them by revising the 
existing Athena mechanism for the 
funding of EU-operations.3  
A permanent capabi l i ty  generat ion 
conference . In fact, Member States spend 
far more money on redundant capabilities 
than would be needed to address the 
strategic shortfalls. The criteria should go 
some way to ensure that defence budgets 
are spent more efficiently and where it is 
most needed. Experience shows however 
that even repeated calls to reconsider and 
harmonize national defence planning in 
order to focus on the common shortfalls 
yield few results. Useful inspiration can be 
found in the method used to launch CSDP 
operations: a Force Generation 
Conference.4 Although such conferences 
can be difficult, as was the case for the 
Chad operation e.g., in the end they have 
always yielded result. Within PSCD, the 
EDA can organize a “Capability 
Generation Conference” aimed at 
remedying all commonly identified 
shortfalls of the Headline Goal 2010 within 
a reasonable timeframe.5  
                                                
3 Currently about 90% of the cost of operations is 
born by the troop-deploying nations under the 
principle of “costs lie where they fall”.  
4 Once the military assets and capabilities 
required for a specific upcoming CSDP operation 
are identified, Force Generation Conferences are 
organised among Troop Contributing Nations. 
This process goes on until the entire list of 
requirements is met.  
5 In defence planning, the first significant results 
can reasonably be expected within 5 years, with 
cruising speed attained within 10 to 15 years. That 
fact should not be a cause for discouragement, but 
should rather stimulate all concerned not to 
postpone action any longer.  
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To participate in PSCD therefore, implies 
that through common dialogue pMS are 
willing:  
- To revisit their respective national 
defence planning, without any 
taboos.  
- To do away with national capability 
initiatives proven to be redundant.  
- To pool assets and capabilities in 
order to generate savings.  
- To contribute in function of their 
GDP to the programmes launched 
to fill the shortfalls.  
- And finally: to remain engaged in 
negotiations for as long as it takes 
to achieve success. 
In this process, the emphasis is put on the 
willingness of pMS, on the common quest 
towards effectiveness and efficiency, on 
convincing one another and not obliging 
one another. As is the case in Force 
Generation Conferences, where Troop 
Contributors take sovereign decisions on 
their respective participation, but at the 
end of the day solve the issue of the overall 
required capabilities. 
Multinat ional  cooperat ion . The reality is 
that many countries are no longer able to 
maintain the range of nationally organized 
capabilities that they possess today. 
Multinational cooperation is essential to 
contribute relevant capabilities in a cost-
effective way. New initiatives can be 
launched were opportunities for 
cooperation are identified, complementing 
the existing initiatives that will thus 
become part of a more comprehensive 
coordinated effort. The beauty of PSCD is 
its flexibility. Within the single PSCD, 
overlapping clusters will emerge, with e.g. 
pMS 1, 2 and 3 cooperating in area X and 
pMS 2, 3, 4 and 5 cooperating in area Y. 
Cooperation can take various forms, from 
joint development or procurement to 
afterwards equip national formations, to 
pooling, i.e. permanent multinational 
formations, either deepening integration in 
relevant existing ones (e.g. the Eurocorps) 
or new initiatives (e.g. European Air 
Transport Command). PSCD can provide 
the link between existing bottom-up 
initiatives and the need for more top-down 
steering.  
CONCRETE ADDED VALUE 
 
The added value of such PSCD is real, for 
the EU, NATO, national governments, 
and taxpayers alike. 
Inc lus iveness . PSCD is not to punish or 
exclude, but to encourage all to do more; 
the best PSCD is that at 27.6 Yes, the 
defence budgets of many individual 
Member States are relatively modest in 
scale, but together they represent tens of 
billions of euros – a chance to get more 
bang out of such sums should not be too 
easily ignored. PSCD should be an 
attractive forum for those able and willing 
to join when it is launched as well for those 
that might join later. Those opting out will 
not suffer direct political disadvantages – 
but they will miss out on the very real 
benefits that PSCD will bring. Hence 
realistic but real criteria: achievable by 
every Member State that wants to, yet a 
binding commitment to do more than 
today; open to entry by all, but ensuring 
growing solidarity and increasingly 
                                                
6 Implying that within PSCD bi- or multilateral 
cooperation between certain pMS cannot be 
vetoed by another pMS; only constructive 
abstention remains possible.  
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ambitious commitments as the process 
continues. 
Coordinat ion . While preserving flexibility 
and bottom-up initiative, coordination 
through the permanent Capability 
Generation Conference should generate 
concrete projects to address all shortfalls 
needed to fulfil the Headline Goal 2010. 
This has proved impossible through an 
exclusively bottom-up approach, which has 
achieved some remarkable results – but 
which has also reached its limits. Without 
collective top-down steering, significant 
progress is beyond reach. Simultaneously, 
the Capability Generation Conference will 
allow those that seek cooperation to find 
suitable partners, including for deepening 
existing multinational units or setting up 
new ones. This is not to pull all 
multinational military units and structures  
into PSCD nor even to have some of them 
managed by PSCD, but to stimulate pMS 
to use the full potential of such 
multinational formations, and to use them 
as frameworks for common deployment – 
in this regard as well cost-effectiveness will 
improve.  
Cost-e f f e c t iveness . The criteria will gently 
oblige pMS to explore the full potential of 
four important cost-cutters: (1) 
collaborative armaments projects (from 
cradle to grave); (2) pooling; (3) role 
specialisation; (4) and perhaps most 
importantly, doing away with redundancies, 
for Europe does not need 1.8 million 
uniforms and the combined cost of all 
redundant assets and structures by far 
exceeds what is required to address the 
strategic shortfalls. These cost-cutters will 
produce budgetary margin needed for the 
required deployable and effectively 
deployed capabilities.  
Assessment . pMS will of course decide, 
but the assessment role given by the Treaty 
to the EDA will ensure that for the first 
time their performance will be evaluated by 
a neutral body. Simultaneously, the 
Capability Generation Conference will 
engender an informal peer review process 
of investment plans. Unlike ESDP, CSDP 
should be more than a catalogue of paper 
commitments.  
Signi f i cant mil i tary contr ibut ions . The 
permanent dialogue on defence planning 
will allow each and every pMS to opt for 
the development of specific military 
capabilities that would allow it to 
participate with significant military 
contributions in all of the potential 
Petersberg Tasks. That requires each to 
focus on his own centres of competence, 
to acquire or further develop those military 
forces and capabilities proven to be scarce 
during Force Generation Conferences, and 
to abandon capabilities proven to be 
redundant. This will considerably enhance 
political solidarity among all Member 
States and will strengthen the Union as 
such, at no additional financial cost.  
Boots on the ground . And what ultimately 
counts most: Europeans will have available 
and will effectively deploy more troops for 
operations, be it under EU, NATO or UN 
command or in another multilateral 
configuration. In so doing they will finally 
live up to the expectations generated by the 
European Security Strategy and the Lisbon 
Treaty.   
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These are half a dozen good reasons why 
Member States should launch PSCD and 
mark the occasion by a declaration of the 
European Council. The Heads of State and 
Government can provide the high-level 
political impetus that will stimulate Foreign 
and Defence Ministers to take permanent 
and structured action.  
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